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CHAPTER 9 
Poverty Law 
PAUL GARRITY and NATASHA ROSE 
§9.1. Introduction. In contrast to the almost moribund situation 
summarized in the 1967 SURVEY, there have been many significant pov-
erty law developments in and affecting Massachusetts in the past two 
years.1 For example, the Supreme Court of the United States has ad-
judicated conflicts resulting in important changes improving the status 
of the poor who reside in public housing2 and who receive public 
assistance.8 The Congress, in the guise of creative federalism but in 
recognition of demonstrated local needs met by local inaction, has 
authorized (but unfortunately underfunded) scores of programs re-
sponding to the housing, income, educational and other problems of 
the poor and disadvantaged.4 
PAUL GAlUlITY is an Assistant Professor of Law at Boston College Law School 
and deputy director of the National Consumer Law Center. 
NATASHA ROSE is a research analyst at the Center for Community Economic 
Development, Cambridge, and a member of the Massachusetts Bar. 
§9.l. 1 In this chapter the authors have not considered domestic relations or 
consUmer and commercial law issues affecting low income individuals and groups 
because of coverage of. these areas in other chapters. Representation of parties in 
domestic relations matters absorbs a significant portion of the average poverty law 
practitioner's time. However, sociological and economic issues far outnumber, and 
are often intertwined with, the relatively few poverty law problems in domestic 
relations, such as, for example, the allocation of insufficient family resources be-
tween separating low income spouses. The most perceptive analysis along these 
lines is contained in tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its 
Origin, Development, and Present Status, 16 Stan. L. Rev. 257, 900 (19M), 17 
Stan. L. Rev. 614 (1965). The 1969 SUJl.VEY devotes an entire chapter to consumer 
law and further coverage would be excessively redundant. Criminal law problems 
are also adequately covered elsewhere. A case could be made for summarizing 
developments in selective service law since it operates most unfairly in respect 
to the poor and disadvantaged, who are rarely eligible for educational and em-
ployment deferments. The authors have been advised that the topic will be taken 
up next year. 
2 See, e.g., Thorpe v. Housing Authority of the City of Durham, !l86 U.s. 670 
(1967). 
8 See, e.g., King v. Smith, !l92 U.S. !l09 (1968); and Shapiro v. Thompson, !l94 
U.s. 618 (1969). 
4 Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 410·48!1 (N.Y. 
Times ed. 1968). Massachusetts' performance parallels that of the federal efforts, 
and a glaring example of equally perverted priorities is Acts of 1969, c. 2!19, where 
an emergency preamble was appended to legislation providing for additional 
copies of the book of biographical sketches and portraits of state officers. 
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Since 1967, federally funded legal services programs have been es-
tablished or augmented in virtually every urban center and geograph-
ical section of the Commonwealth. II There has been an attendant in-
crease in poverty law litigation, including several reported appellate 
decisions. The Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, which assists and 
coordinates the test case activities of legal services programs on a state-
wide basis, has allocated a considerable portion of its resources to the 
drafting of and lIuccessfullobbying for legisla,tion.6 However, most of 
the activities on behalf of low income individuals and neighborhoods 
by attornc:ys repJ:esenting the poor have been and will remain unre-
ported in:the compi,lations of caseS and statutes. The day-to-day advo-
cacy of; legal ~rvices lawyers and volunteer private practitioners in 
situations invoM~g t the draf~ng of model leases for public housing 
telllUlts, negotiating wi~ city officials for improved Il).unicipal services, 
acting as co'I.J~l in administrative hearings and in achie~ng com-
promise cmdsettlement by the mere fact of their J,"epresentation in sit-
. uationa involving consumer fraud, has. ma,de the . law far more respon-
sive'to the poor than several volumes of enlightened but rarely relied 
pn or appliet;l case qr statutory precedents. . 
§9.2. Legal services. The first and only prior, SURVEY summary of 
poverty law developments, in 1967, concluded with a discussion of le-
gal services;l but in 1969 it is perhaps more appropriate to begin this 
report and analysis from t,he perspective of the developers. Perhaps 
the best way .of approximating a definition of poverty law, if it still 
requires defining after decades of national reflection and debate,2 is 
to focus on the goals of legal services programs.s Whatever the priority 
selected by-the lOCal program, most legal services attorneys view their 
responsibiJiti~ as including (1) representation of individuals and 
groups firiandally unable to retain legal;counsel; (2) reformation of 
law arid insututians which discriminate against the poor; and (3) ed-
ucationaf the poor to recognize their legal problems and to resort to 
the appropriate' forum for redress. The attempt to achieve anyone of 
these goals results in confrontation with organizatiol'ls concerned with 
II Programs have been estabijshed in Boston, Bro,ckton, Cambridge, Fitchburg, 
Holyoke, Lowell, Lynn, .New Bedfor~, Pittsfiqd. Revere. Sprhlgfield,. Worcester 
and on Cape Cod. 
e For a IUJDmary, .of this legislation see Law Reform Newsletter 28-115 (Oct. 
1969). published by th,e Maaachueetts Law Reform Institute. 
§9.2. 1 See 1967 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law, Chapter 5. 
2For differinlperspeetivesoo the dimensions of poverty, see J. Riis, How the 
Other Half Lives (1890): J. Ford and K. Ford, The Abolition of Poverty.{I957); 
and lleport Qf Ute National AdviaoryCommission on Civil Disorders (N.Y. Thnes 
ed. 1968). 
S CCH lov. L. llep. ,6700 (1969). The most comprehensive analysis of legal 
-=nices programa in operatioo is to be found in Comment, Neighborhood Law 
0fIic;eI: The New Wave in Legal Services for the Poor, 8Q Harv. L. Rev. 805 
(1967). 
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preserving the status quo. To achieve more than one of theseobjec-
tives involves reconciling the conflict between the dream of delivering 
comprehensive quality legal services to the poor and the reality of lim-
ited personnel and financial resources. 
In contrast to the American Medical Association's stand on med-
icare and medicaid, the American Bar Association has strongly en-
dorsed the Office of Economic OppOrtunities (OEO) Legal Services 
Program since its inception." However, since 1967, in order to mollify 
the objections of the more conservative segments of the legal profes-
sion there has been a requirement that both state and local bar a&-
sociations must be consulted before new legal services programs. are 
established and prior to the refunding or major program modification 
of existing projects. In 1969, these conditions were further refined and 
formalized by inclusion in the Code of Federal Regulations.1I 
The Massachusetts Bar Association has been involved in· reviewing 
proposals for legal services as to both form and substance and to date 
has not assumed a position in opposition either to the establishment 
of a new program or to the refunding of an existing one.6 A few local 
bar associations have strenuously opposed the establishment of legal 
services projects in their communities for various reasons. Some attor-
neysvoice their opposition in terms of concern about a federal take--
over of the representation of indigents, which is viewed as primarily 
the responsibility of an independent bar, while others consider legal 
serv,ices programs to be a threat to their livelihood. 
Aggressive advocacy by legal services attorneys and their involve-
ment with unpopular clients has led to efforts of political repression 
as well as bar vigilance. In late 1969, the so-called "Murphy Amend-
ment," an attempt by the California senator to have Congress enact 
a gubernatorial veto power over legal services ptograms, was defeated 
only after an intense national lobbying effort by legal setvices attor-
neys. The Massachusetts and American Bar Associations, as wen as 
other state bars, commendably and vigorously opposed what was ac-
curately characterized. as a deplorable effort to emasculate the inde-
pendence of lawyers.7 
In their concerns to educate their potential clients concerning their 
legal rights and remedies, legal services attorneys have adopted a vari· 
ety of techniques which, if utilized by the private practitioner, would 
be hastily condemned as in violation of the canons of eihics. Adver-
tisements as to the availability and scope of legal services offered and 
exhortations to pursue suggested legal remedies have been circulated 
4 See ~A Resolution on the OEO Legal Services Program adopted by the 
House of Delegates, February 8, 1965, CCH Pov. L. Rep. 116110 (1969). 
1145 C.F.R. §1061 (1969). 
6 Interview with John M. Ferren, co· chairman, Committee on Legal Services to 
the Poor of the Massachusetts Bar Association, in Boston, Nov. 12, .1969. 
7 Feinberg; Poverty Lawyers for Effective Advocacy; Chairman'. R.eport, 5 
Clearinghouse Rev. 188 (Dec. 1969). 
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! 
in pamphlets and announced through the news media.S Such activity 
was formerly unofficially sanctioned' and has now apparently been ap-
proved by the revised canons.10 
The final area of concern which has been the object of much bar 
scrutiny is the client financial eligibility guidelines proposed by OEO, 
usually modified by local bar associations and then adopted by legal 
services programs. The current limits grantjndigencystatus and thus 
allow representation by legal services attorneys to a person with an an-
nual net income ranging between $2500 to $3000 with $500 allowed 
for each additional dependent.11 These figures, when placed in the 
context of a family of six subsisting on approximately $100 per week, 
are disgracefully inadequate and should be increased to more reason-
able limits. However. a tongue-in-cheek argument in favor of lowered 
eligibility limits might be advanced by some legal services attorneys, 
all of whom are deluged by both caseload and causes. 
In spite of seemingly lavish funding, most legal services programs in 
Massachusetts have been inundated by indigent clients seeking vindi-
cation of the rights which were exhumed or established, and then pub-
licized, by these very same programs. When the war-on-poverty war-
riors first came on the local scene in late 1965 and early 1966, in their 
first gush of enthusiasm they announced and advertised their avail-
ability to all indigent clients. They vocally condemned community 
chest and bar association underfunded legal aid societies, which had 
defined their priorities in terms of social utility and characterized 
their activities as charitable. More pragmatic than moralistic, the legal 
services attorneys have rationalized their necessary decision to cut back 
individual client service. and have adopted the jargon of "achieving 
maximum impact with limited resources." There has occurred a shift-
ing of emphasis to "law reform." never defined. and contemporane-
ously to a debate concerning 40w best to limit client intake.12 Judi-
care, once condemned out of hand as a pocket-lining plot by greedy 
lawyers. is now being reexamined as furnishing respite from the dreary 
repetition of simple but time-consuming domestic relations, eviction, 
and consumer caseS.18 Some short-range expedients to combine client 
service with law reform have been employed. such as use of volunteer 
practitioners and supervised law students whose appetite for poverty 
law has been further whetted by the new law school courses for which 
they themselves agitated. Unfortunately, in spite of these additional 
personnel inputs, even in a state as supposedly saturated with legal 
services programs as Massachusetts, the poor by and large go unrepre-
8 See generally Comment, Ethical Problems Raised by the Neighborhood Law 
Office, 41 Notre Dame Law. 961 (1966). 
'Notes on Ethics, 511 A.B.A.]. 1148 (1967). 
10 See ABA. COde of Professional Responsibility (1969). 
11 CCH Pov. L R:ep. 1171100 (1969). . 
12 Silver, Imminent Failure of Legal Services for the Poor: Why and How to 
Limit Caseloads, 46 ]. Urban L. 217 (1968). 
18 See Robb, Alternative Legal Assistance Plans, 14 Catholic Law. 127 (1968). 
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sented. Instead of concentrating on adding additional representational 
manpower, perhaps the justice system itself should be studied with a 
view to revamping it to provide more ready access to those unreached 
by it.14 
§9.3. Public assistance. The topic most commonly associated with 
poverty law would be that of public assistance. Academic preoccupa-
tion with the issue of whether welfare is a right to be demanded or 
largesse to be bestowed1 has been eclipsed by the grotesque phenom-
enon of increasing and bitter poverty amidst unparalleled affluence. 
Unlike the docile poor of other generations, the growing numbers of 
those receiving public assistance have been organized and radicalized 
by such groups as the Welfare Rights Organization and Mothers for 
Adequate Welfare. For the past two years newspapers have contained 
constant reports of demonstrations and confrontations. The demands 
of recipients to be allowed adequate benefit levels and to be serviced 
with some semblance of dignity have conflicted with the needs of the 
Commonwealth in controlling welfare within its fiscal limits and ad-
ministrative competencies.2 A demonstration stemming from this con-
flict was the spark that ignited a civil disorder in Roxbury in 1967; 
but fortunately, since then, conflict resolution has been channeled into 
legislative and litigative modes. While most recent litigation which has 
involved issues of adequacy of assistance and procedural due process 
has been adjudicated by welfare referees, and is presently pending in 
state and federal courts, there have been a few significant decisions 
since 1967. Legislatively, the process of change has been more visible. 
In August 1969, Governor Sargent approved comprehensive welfare 
legislation - Chapter 885 of the Acts of 1969, amending most aspects 
of the Commonwealth's public assistance law. This legislation was 
drafted to remedy some of the administrative and bureaucratic prob-
lems resulting from the equally comprehensive 1967 reorganization 
amendments, which replaced local welfare programs with a state fi-
nanced and operated system.3 In contrast, most of the 1969 legislation 
could be characterized as regulatory and was devised apparently in 
political response to allegations of irregularities and abuses which, 
upon investigation, invariably fail of corroboration. 
Chapter 885, in many ways, mirrors the schizophrenic welfare sys-
tem it statutorily amends. Several sections codify some of the more 
progressive articulations of welfare rights, while other portions, ap-
parently in the interests of fiscal necessity, continue the notion that 
welfare recipients are something other than full citizens of the body 
140 For some interesting suggestions, see Cahn and Cahn, What Price Justice: 
The Civilian Perspective Revisited, 41 Notre Dame Law. 927 (1966). 
§9.11. 1 See Reich, The New Property, 711 Yale L.J. 71111 (1964). 
2 See generally Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, 
54 Calif. L. Rev. 479 (1966). 
3 Acts of 1967, c. 658. For an analysis of the legislation, see 1967 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §5.8. 
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politic.4 The distinctions among categories of welfare recipients rein-
forcing the centuries-old dichotomy between the "worthy" and the 
"unworthy" poor have been retained with somewhat separate statut-ory 
treatment accorded recipients of aid to families with dependent chil-
dren (AFDC), old age assistance (OAA) and disability assistance (DA). 
In both the former and the new legislation, one could classify OAA 
recipients as second class, DA recipients as third class, and AFDC re-
cipients as last class citizens.1> 
The first few sections of Chapter 885 define in greater detail the or-
ganization of the welfare department by specifying areas of responsi-
bility for assistant commissioners.6 This is, perhaps, in response to 
reports of bureaucratic bumbling at the decision-making level of the 
department, caused both by ineptitude and by inadequate staffing. 
The next significant amendments spell out the duties of the fraud-
ulent claims board and establish criminal penalties for the "knowing" 
making of a false representation to receive or to procure welfare pay-
ments.T These sections were amended in 1968,8 and again just before 
the passage of Chapter 885.9 This "overamending" is most likely a 
case of legislators' overreaction under supposed pressure from constit-
uents. The most recent amendment requires the board to report viola-
tions to the attorney general, but eliminates the requirement of the 
previous version which mandated either a criminal prosecution or a 
civil action to recover benefits fraudulently obtained.10 Vendors of 
goods and services to the department are further penalized by exclu-
sion from participating as vendors in any welfare program for three 
years.11 Both recipients and vendors are required to reimburse the 
Commonwealth, upon demand, for payments received to which they 
were not entitled.12 In the case of indigent recipients, the impossibility 
of enforcement of this provision again creates the impression of stat-
utory amendment for political purposes.18 The cliche of the father 
who deserts to enable his family to receive welfare assistance is granted 
credibility by the imposition for a criminal penalty for such conduct.14 
4 See Wedemeyer and Moore, The American Welfare System, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 
826 (1966). 
Ii See, e.g., Acts of 1969, c. 687, which increases the amount of the leisure time 
activities allowance paid to OAA and DA recipients., Apparently, AFDC recipients 
do not have leisure time since they receive no such allowance. See also Acts of 
1969, c. 708, providing school lunches for "needy" elderly persons. See also, R. 
Elman, The Poorhouse State-The American Way of Life on Public Assistance 
(1966). 
6 Acts of 1969, c. 885, §8. 
TId. §5B. 
8 Acts of 1968, c. 275. 
9 Acts of 1969, c. 707, §2. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Acts of 1969, c. 885, §6. 
12 Ibid. 
18 See Graham, Public Assistance: The Right to Receive: the Obligation to Re-
pay, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 451 (1968). 
14 Acts of 1969, c. 885, §6. 
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Not only would proof of this offense appear to be impossible, but the 
fact of its occurring would seem to be quite remote since Massachusetts 
public assistance policies allow families to receive welfare although 
both parents remain in the home. The next few amendments provide 
for some modicum of citizen participation at both the state advisory 
board and community service board levels by requiring appointment 
of welfare recipients to these boards. Iii For some reason these amend-
ments provide for greater welfare recipient representation at the state 
than at the local level, which may reflect a political decision confirm-
ing the reality of harsher local attitudes toward those receiving welfare. 
Chapter 18, Section 16, which details fair hearing requirements af-
ter denial or termination of assistance, has been completely rewrit-
ten.16 "Coercion" or otherwise improper conduct perpetrated by a 
welfare worker is now explicitly appealable by a recipient. In accor-
dance with evolving due process requirements,17 assistance is contin-
ued pending an appeal for termination or reduction of assistance 
where an issue of fact or judgment is involved. Apparently, summary 
termination would be allowed when the department makes a palpably 
erroneous legal interpretation. Assistance is to be continued, according 
to the wording of the amendment, "through the end of the month in 
which the final decision on the hearing ,is reached."18 Does this mean 
that assistance is to be continued until the referee's determination is 
made, when it is reviewed in superior court, or when the Supreme 
Judicial Court passes on the matter several years later? Litigation has 
been filed in the superior court petitioning for continuation of assis-
tance pending judicial review of a referee's decision.19 Additionally, 
it would have been desirable to have included provision for a steno-
graphic record of the referee's hearing and also to have required that 
a recipient be advised in writing of his or her rights to appeal. All too 
often welfare workers summarily reject applicant requests for increased 
assistance or special needs without informing them of the appealabil-
ity of the summary rejection. Unfortunately, there was included no 
provision requiring access to the client recipient's record by his attor-
ney and for the compilation of decisions in fair hearings for precedent 
purposes. Both of these matters have also been the subject of litiga-
tion.20 It is curious to note that case records can be inspected by state 
legislators and are available to recipients' agents, but they are not spe-
cifically available to legal counsel. Notable also is the fact that the 
115 Id. §§7, 8. 
16Id. §ll. 
17 See generally, Burrus and Fessler, Constitutional Due Process Hearing Re-
quirements in the Administration of Public Assistance: The District of Columbia 
Experience, 16 Am. U.L. Rev. 199 (1967). 
18 C.L., c. 18, §11. 
19 Rankin v. Ott, reported in Law Reform Newsletter 11 (May 1969). 
20 Malfi v_ Kelleher, reported in Law Reform Newsletter 9 (Oct. 1969); and 
R'uaell v. Ott, reported in Law Reform Newsletter 10 (May 1969). 
7
Garrity and Rose: Chapter 9: Poverty Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1969
178 1969 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETI'S LAW §9.3 
implementation of a Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
(HEW) regulation originally scheduled to become effective October 1, 
1969, and which requires states, with partial federal reimbursement, 
to furnish counsel to welfare recipients in administrative hearings held 
to review the denial, termination or reduction of welfare benefits, has 
been delayed until July 1, 1970.21 However, a decision of the superior 
court in July 1969 appears to mandate this requirement despite the 
delay in the implementation of the HEW regulation.22 
The next amendment restricts the granting of household furniture 
to recipients by requiring a father who is unemployed or who has 
abandoned his family to reimburse the department for its cost and 
also by severely limiting the allowance of furniture as a special need.23 
Welfare rights groups have been most successful in organizing recip-
ients by assessing emergency or replacement household needs and 
then by pressing for furniture grants on their behalf. Prior to this 
amendment, departmental furniture grants policy was tightened up 
in order to dampen organizing efforts, but concomitant litigation re-
sulted in a return to the status quO.24 The new legislation has achieved 
what policy was unable to accomplish. 
The next important amendment allows the department a lien on 
private homes to the extent that the purchase is accomplished with 
welfare moneys.25 This provision and the prohibition on purchase of 
income property by welfare recipients26 constitute two of the more re-
gressive features of Chapter 885. Instead of lessening dependency, such 
legislation fosters it. There is also the problem of defining what con-
stitutes welfare moneys. Consider, for example, the very reasonable 
departmental practice, instituted to insure regularity of support pay-
ments, which allows a wife to receive her bi-weekly support from the 
welfare office if she turns over to the department payments she received 
from her husband. What is and what is not welfare money here? Con-
trasted with these amendments, is the authorization granted to the 
department to proceed, in both the probate and district courts, directly 
against those responsible to support welfare recipients.27 This amend-
ment would satisfy those interested in fiscal efficiency and also those 
concerned with the possible fragmenting of family relationships when 
a recipient is required to initiate her own court proceeding for nonsup-
port. However, the amendment appears to be in conflict with a later 
amendment requiring the bringing of criminal proceedings by a recip-
21 Law Reform Newsletter 117 (Oct. 1969); see generally, Comment, Right to 
Counsel in Public Welfare Hearings, 48 B.U.L. Rev. 468 (1968). 
22 Aiello v. Ott, No. 865117 Eq. (Suffolk Super. Ct., Feb. 11, 1969). 
23 Acts of 1969, c. 885, §12. 
24 Harrison v. Massachusetts Dept. of Public Welfare, CCH Pov. L. Rep. 
1110420 (1969). 
25 Acts of 1969, c. 885, §12. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
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ient "in appropriate cases," apparently according to the discretion of 
the department.28 
The next several amendments are directed at defining the responsi-
bilities of welfare workers. It appears from the legislation that a wel-
fare worker is to wear two hats - that of a social worker and that of a 
policeman. This again typifies the schizophrenic mix of Chapter 885. 
Welfare workers are required to assist recipients in obtaining social 
services, but they are also under direction to visit each recipient peri-
odically and have the recipient certify in writing he or she will inform 
the department of any changes in eligibility for assistance.29 The 
amendment further requires that an application for assistance contain 
a waiver allowing the department to investigate all facts relating to 
eligibility, a directive which seems to negate basic concepts of right to 
privacy.30 It is interesting to note that recipients of aid to families with 
dependent children must be visited at more frequent intervals than 
those in other welfare categories.31 Again, anomalously, a very progres-
sive feature authorizing the employment of welfare recipients as case 
aides is included in this amendment.32 
The skein of paternalism rampant throughout Chapter 885 is typi-
fied by provisions authorizing public housing landlords to receive 
rental payments directly from the department.33 Private landlords are 
allowed this option if the tenant is two months' rent in arrears. Land-
lord utilization of both provisions is appealable by the recipient, and 
prerequisite to their use is a requirement that the dwelling meet mini-
mum housing code standards. It has been an altogether too frequent 
occurrence - quite similar to the indirect subsidies of practices of 
ghetto furniture and appliance merchants specializing in selling to 
welfare clientele34 - that state welfare moneys are diverted to subsidiz-
ing slumlords of substandard housing. This abuse is theoretically 
relieved by requiring welfare workers to institute rent withholding 
proceedings in cases where it is legally possible. However, the reality 
that suitable alternative housing is at best in short supply or at worst 
nonexistent compels the observation that such legislation is irrelevant. 
In spite of documentation that there are very few employable welfare 
recipients, extensive amendments were enacted focusing on this issue 
28Id. §20. 
29Id. §12. 
80 See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 
lI87 U.s. 5211 (1967); and Parrish v. Civil Service Commn. of the County of Alameda, 
66 Cal. 2d 260, 57 Cal. Rptr. 62!!, 425 P.2d 2211 (1967). See generally, Handler and 
Rosenheim, Privacy in Welfare: Public Assistance and Juvenile Justice, III Law Be 
Contemp. Prob. !!77 (1966). 
81 Acts of 1969, c. 885, §12. 
32 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., !!50 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 
1965). 
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with. some very interesting inconsistencies.36 For example" if an appli-
cant for assistance fails, if required, to register for work and to accept 
suitable employment when offered, no assistance will be given. The 
minor children of the ineligible applicant will continue to receive assis-
tance. The intent is that the recipient work or starve, but what will, of 
course, really happen is that the entire family will eat less. Requiring 
an employable welfare recipient to work is eminently rational, but how 
to accomplish this in a manner which withholds punishment from the 
innocent remains in the realm of converting dross into gold. The 
general chapter applicable to all welfare recipients3a now requires all 
male applicants for assistance between 18 and 62 to register for work 
with the Division of Employment Security.37 However, the general 
law pertaining to aid to families with dependent children38 was 
amended to require unemployed fathers and dependent males 16 years 
of age or older and not in school to register for work.3o This, of course, 
conflicts with the general chapter which, for example, orders to work a 
19-year-old male who is dependent and in college. Also, for some reason, 
unemployed young girls are excluded from the work requirements. 
Once the children of a mother receiving AFDC are in high school, this 
mother must register for work, but she need not accept employment 
as a domestic or laborer between 6 P.M. and 6 A.M. Male welfare recip-
ients apparently must accept employment as a domestic if such work is 
"suitable." There has been some litigation initiated to test certain wel-
fare work requirement provisions, but these cases have not yet reached 
the appellate leve1.40 The language in the prior AFDC statute to the 
effect that "the Department shall determine what aid is necessary to 
enable such parent to bring up such child or children" was retained 
in Chapter 885.41 Unfortunately, the amount of aid which "shall be 
sufficient" to maintain an adequate standard of living is "determined 
in accordance with the budgetary standards of the department .... "42 
Litigation has been filed challenging the adequacy of public assistance 
grants, but the suit was dismissed by the superior court with the terse 
comment "the law has not come this far."43 
There are scores of other less significant amendments too numerous 
to report which in all likelihood will be reamended in subsequent 
sessions of the General Court. One overall observation concerning 
Chapter 885 which should be made is that several amendments con-
86 Acts of 1969, c. 885, §14. 
86 G.L., c. 117. 
87 Acts of 1969, c. 885, §14. 
88 G.L., C.' U8. 
89 Acts of 1969, c. 885, §20. 
40 See, e.g., Duato v. Ott, reported in Mass. L. Refonn Inst. Law Reform News-
letter 12 (Oct. 1969). 
41 Acts of 1969, c. 885, §20. 
42Id. §18. 
48 Johnson v. Ott, CCH Pov. L. Rep. ~10417 (1969). 
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tain the language, "if not inconsistent with the federal [regulations]."44 
There is considerable doubt as to the legality of many of these pro-
visions which, when contrasted with prior welfare legislation and poli-
cies, are quite reactionary. It would not be surprising if litigation is 
filed challenging continuation of federal payments to the Common-
wealth for the administration of such a patently regressive welfare 
scheme. 
Three reported decisions, in addition to several district and superior 
court prosecutions for trespass, disturbing the peace and related of-
fenses, have resulted from the militancy of welfare recipients. The 
demonstrations and confrontations that have occurred have had as 
their ultimate objective the breakdown and eventual dismantling of 
the current welfare system and its replacement by some form of guar-
anteed annual income.45 
In Massachusetts Welfare Rights Organization v. Ott,46 a declaratory 
judgment was sought in order to determine the constitutionality of a 
department directive establishing procedures to be followed by welfare 
personnel during demonstrations, disturbances or sit-ins. The United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts decided that the 
directive guidelines were sufficiently specific and appropriate. The 
court rejected as frivolous the plaintiffs' contentions that their rights 
to assemble and petition for redress of grievances had been denied. 
There is no question that disruptive sit-ins are not constitutionally pro-
tected, but peaceful mass demonstrations with the resulting political 
pressure they engender are a valuable safety-valve in siphoning off 
potential civil disorders. To deny applicants the recourse to apply for 
supplemental benefits when their requests are buttressed by the tech-
nique of mass demonstration, as was done in this case, appears in-
appropriate when such benefits are urgently required to maintain 
living standards. Recipients may conclude that they have no alter-
native but to escalate their tactics. 
In Hurley v. Hinckley,47 which involved mass sit-ins in a local wel-
fare office, the federal district court determined that the Massachusetts 
trespass statute was not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. The 
court also found that the demonstrators' conduct was disruptive.and 
impeded the "normal use of the welfare office for the public purposes 
to which it was dedicated."48 In LeClair v. O'Neil,49 another case aris-
ing from a welfare office sit-in, but which involved only five persons, 
while a preliminary injunction was issued by a three-judge panel 
against the enforcement of the Massachusetts "disturbers of the peace" 
44 See, e.g., Acts of 1969, c. 885, §12. 
45 See generally, Albert, The Nixon Welfare Proposals: An Exercise in Poverty, 
II Clearinghouse Rev. 125 (Oct. 1969). 
46299 F. Supp. 296 (D. Mass. 1969). 
471104 F. Supp. 704 (D. Mass. 1969). 
48Id. at 709. 
491109 F. Supp. 621 (D. Mass. 1969). 
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statute, the court held that the plaintiffs had no standing to maintain 
their action. 
Two cases decided in the 1969 SURVEY year, one at the federal and 
one at the state level, were reported concerning interpretations of 
substantive public assistance law. In Robertson v. Ott,rIO a three-judge 
federal court declared unconstitutional and permanently enjoined en-
forcement of the Massachusetts statute conditioning the receipt of 
AFDC public assistance upon residency within the Commonwealth 
for one year. The court noted that similar statutes in other jurisdic-
tions were being challenged successfully and ruled that the Massachu-
setts statute violated federal equal protection and unconstitutionally 
abridged the right to travel. 
In Carroll v. Acting Director of Public Welfare of Cambridge,ln peti-
tioner's public assistance was terminated when income earned by her 
16-year-old son living with her, less deductions of $50 per month and 
certain work-related expenses, exceeded the allowable welfare budget 
for the family, which included Mrs. Carroll, the son and a younger 
daughter. The public assistance policy requiring this result was quite 
explicit, but petitioner raised several points, including the proposition 
that her 16-year-old son, had he been 18, would have received a deduc-
tion from income credited to him in excess of $50 and that this was an 
obvious discrimination. The petitioner further argued that the depart-
ment's policy conflicted with another rule relieving brothers of the 
responsibility to support sisters, and also that the required interpre-
tation would force the son to leave the home (as he had threatened) 
and thus result in a disintegration of the family unit. The Supreme 
Judicial Court determined that it was reasonable for an 18-year-old to 
have greater expenses and that the state policy was in accordance with 
federal guidelines. The Court totally ignored petitioner's last argu-
ment. 
A very interesting pronouncement in a case involving Section 24A 
of the general public assistance statute1S2 was handed down in Children's 
Hospital Medical Center v. City of Boston.53 In that decision the Su-
preme Judicial Court allowed reimbursement to the plaintiff for the 
first,of three admissions of an indigent patient to the hospital. While 
the Court observed that "it was good medical practice to continue the 
treatment at Children's which was the most convenient and logical 
hospital to handle the case," the Court went on to decide that the 
hospital knew the child was indigent at the second admission and "it 
would have been reasonable to refuse her admission." What is most 
interesting about this decision is the Court's strained use of the word 
"reasonable." To rephrase the Court's statement of its holding: If a 
person is poor it is reasonable for a hospital to tum this patient away 
rIO 284 F. Supp. 7!15 (D. Mass. 1968). 
51 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 89, 24!1 N.E.2d 817 (1969). 
52 G.L., C. 117. 
13 !l54 Mass. 228, 2!16 N.E.2d 878 (1968). 
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even though it would be good medical practice and also convenient 
and logical for the hospital to admit that patient. Hospitals receive 
direct and indirect subsidies in the form of federal grants and exemp-
tion from most taxation.1i4 It is amusing to contrast the same Court's 
agonizing sustaining of a public purpose in Massachusetts Housing 
Finance Agency v. New England Merchants National Bank of Boston.55 
Perhaps it would be best to further recast the issue by saying that, in 
other than cases of medical necessity, a private hospital can tum away 
poor patients. If the issue were so flagrantly stated, a re-examination of 
the grant worthiness and taxable status of such hospitals would and 
should be inevitable. 
One final item of interest which cuts across all categories of poverty 
law but which is particularly germane to "public welfare law" was the 
enactment of Chapter 806 of the Acts of 1969. The Kerner Report5e 
accurately assessed the frustration experienced by the poor in the lack 
of control they possess over most aspects of their lives. Since most poor 
people are subject to the activities of the governmental agencies that 
house and support them, and otherwise govern their existence, the 
right to access to these agencies, as well as to knowledge of their oper-
ations, seems fundamental. In Massachusetts it was formerly quite 
difficult to ascertain even the existence of some state agencies. Chapter 
806 has relieved some of the obstacles to rectifying administrative 
agency nonresponsiveness. By June 30, 1970, all agency regulations not 
published by the secretary of the Commonwealth will be void, and 
future regulations and notices of hearings concerning any matter must 
be published in advance. Copies of these regulations must be made 
available to the public at cost and are required to be open to inspec-
tion at every office of the particular agency. The one problem is that 
enforcement is left to the office of the attorney general which usually, 
and sometimes justifiably, rationalizes its inertia by claims of lack of 
money and manpower. 
§9.4. Housing. Most low income individuals and families are 
tenants either of substandard private housing or of physically adequate 
but spirit destroying public housing. The poor who do own their own 
homes are usually elderly and subsist on fixed incomes. They are sub-
ject to the double financial crunch of high repair and maintenance 
costs and soaring real property tax rates. Their legislative property 
tax exemptionsl have been minimized by judicially required revalu-
ations.2 
54 See Rose, Hospital Admission of the Poor and the Hill-Burton Act, S Clear-
inghouse Rev. 186 (Dec. 1969). 
511 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 987, 249 N.E.2d 599 (1969). See §9.4 infra. 
56 Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (N.Y. Times 
ed. 1968). 
§9.4. 1 G.L., c. 59, §5(41). 
2 Carr v. Assessors of Springfield, 339 Mass. 89, 157 N.E.2d 880 (1959). 
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. Any progress in establishing poor tenants' rights,S especially in a 
jurisdiction where tp.e law has been predisposed to favor landlord in-
terests, generates benefits to more affluent tenants. However, indigent 
consuJV.ers of housing are helped to a greater degree because of their 
ahllost total lack of bargaining power in the grim marketplace of hous-
ing within their financial means.4 The ultimate - and only realistic-
solution involves the construction and rehabilitation of decent low 
income h9using in sufficient quantity, but the most optimistic federal 
and .state programs developed to date may not even provide for replace-
ment o~ housing stock currently abandoned and demolished. Stop-gap 
responses to the low income crisis include the adoption by Boston 
of rent controls5 and the enactment of rent review and restricted occu-
pancy ordinances by Qther municipalities. The logic is vaguely Alice-
in-Wonderland; if rents are artificially maintained at a fairly constant 
level in a period of spir~Jing inflation, more low income housing will 
be available. The rub is the inevitable disappearance of moderate and 
middle income housing. Mter all of the rhetoric dissipates, the crux of 
the matter can be seen as one of governmental priorities, but this, 
unlike tenants rights and remedies, is political and not legal. 
In fact, 1968 and 1969 were banner legislative years for tenants in 
Mas~achusetts. One bill banned lockout clauses in all prospective 
residential rental agreements.6 Another declared illegal lease provisions 
allowing landlords to enter a tenant's premises except under very 
limit~d circumstances.7 Contained in this latter bill, also applied pro-
spectively, was a prohibition on security deposits in excess of two 
months' rent, which arguably applies to all rental agreements. However, 
the abuse of the unscrupulous landlord who makes a practice of 
retaining security deposits was not legislatively cured. One solution to 
this problem would be to establish a speedy arbitration remedy when 
a security deposit is withheld by a landlord. 
Other significant legislation was contained in this same bill. Ex-
penses levied against a tenant who locks himself out of an apartment 
were restricted to out of pocket reimbursement.s Also, landlords were 
f9rbidden to impose interest on, or a penalty for, rent arrears until 
30 days have elapsed.9 This statute provides some relief where special 
charges and penalties are imposed upon public housing tenants, who 
can least afford to pay them.l0 The Ping-Pong ball of allowable stays 
8 See Garrity, Re-designing Landlord-Tenant Concepts for an Urban Society, 46 
J. Urban L. 695 (1969). 
4 See Symposium, ~ousing: Part I: Perspectives and Problems, 32 Law &: Con-
temp. Prob. 187 (1967). 
Ii Boston, Mass., Ordinances c. 10 (Nov. 21, 1969). 
6 Acts of 1969,' c. 115. 
7 Acts of 1969, c. 244 .. 
S Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 See Comment, Fires in Public Housing. 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1538 (1968). 
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of-execution after eviction for other than nonpayment of rent has 
bounced back to six months after its low level of three months,11 and 
waivers of eviction notices have been declared void. The summary 
aspect of summary process has been mitigated for poor tenants by legis~ 
lation which provides for the waiving of appeal bonds after eviction 
where the tenant is indigent and where the court is satisfied the defense 
presented is not frivolous.12 
A very valuable weapon in the arsenal of attorneys representing 
tenants living in substandard housing in Massachusetts has been the 
statutory scheme of rent withholding originally enacted in 1965. Al-
though this legislation was and still is quite radical, some militants 
have progressed beyond the "legal rent strike," which accurately sum-
marizes the Massachusetts legislation, and have resorted to building 
take-overs and "squat-ins." These latter tactics, however, are employed 
to demonstrate the need for, and in some instances actually to obtain~ 
more housing rather than to dramatize the pressing need for the 
rehabilitation of existing housing. IS 
The original Massachusetts legislation involves three tenant remedies 
which have been pursued with little success without statutory authori-
zation by legal services attorneys in other jurisdictions. The first 
remedy creates a defense to summary process for nonpayment of 
rent;14 the second, commonly called "rent escrow," allows a tenant to 
petition a district court to receive and hold rent moneys which it 
would then release to a landlord for repairs;15 and the third, "rent 
receivership," involves appointment of a receiver by the superior court 
to manage and to rehabilitate substandard premises.16 All of these 
remedies are somewhat involved and, when first utilized by tenants' 
organizations which proceeded without the assistance of counsel, led to 
evictions whenever there was a failure to comply technically with the 
statute.17 
One of the more valid criticisms of this statutory scheme has been 
the susceptibility of tenants using it to retaliation by enraged land-
lords.18 When one of these proceedings has been filed in court the 
tenant is afforded relief from unwarranted eviction,19 butsome land-
lords, when the precondition of a complaint of unsafe or unsanitary 
11 Acts of 1969, c. 365, and Acts of 1969, c. Il5. For an extensive discussion of 
summary process, see §5.7 supra. . 
12 Acts of 1969, c. 366. See Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037 (1967). 
IS See Bay State Banner, Jan. IS, 1970, at I, col. 3. 
14 G.L., c. 239, §8A. 
lIS G.L., c. Ill, §127F. 
16 G.L., c. Ill, §127H. 
17 Interview with Paul Newman, attorney, Community Legal Assistance Office, 
Cambridge, Mass., Nov. 25, 1969. 
18 See Comment, Retaliatory Evictions and the Reporting of Housing COde 
Violations in the District of Columbia, 36 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 190 (1967). 
19 Acts of 1968, c. 404, §I. 
15
Garrity and Rose: Chapter 9: Poverty Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1969
186 1969 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSE'ITS LAW §9.4 
premises is lodged against them with an office of housing inspection, 
retaliate against a tenant by evicting or by raising his rent.20 The 
General Court has comprehensively and effectively penalized this prac-
tice.21 Retaliation, where proven, is established as a defense to sum-
mary process, and tenants who are so victimized are allowed to institute 
a private action for damages, with a minimum recovery of one month's 
rent and counsel fees. The new statute also deals with the probabilities 
by imposing the burden on the landlord by way of a rebuttable pre-
sumption to prove his action was not retaliatory where an eviction 
or increase in rent occurred within six months of the tenant's report of 
violation of occupancy standards to an office of housing inspection. 
One possible problem of interpretation is whether the six month pre-
sumption creates a quasi-statute of limitations, but the legislation con-
tains no mention of the tenant's cause of action lapsing after six 
months. The statute also appears to create a de facto situation of 
prohibiting for six months the eviction of, or an increase in rent to, a 
tenant who reports his landlord to a local housing inspection agency. 
Also, while the statute refers to a defense to summary process in broad 
terms, it would seem that a tenant might still be evicted for nonpay-
ment of rent unless, perhaps, he withholds his rent and housing code 
violations exist. In such a case it could be argued (assuming notice to 
a housing inspection agency) that the tenant falls within the protec-
tion of the rent withholding statute despite his noncompliance with its 
technical notice requirements. 
Some of these same technical requirements of rent withholding were 
mitigated by the enactment of a bill allowing rent withholding by a 
tenant as a defense to summary process after written notification to a 
landlord of the housing violations by an office of housing inspection.22 
Previously, the tenant himself was required to furnish written notice 
to a landlord of his intent to withhold rent and the reasons for the 
withholding. Also, it was necessary that the tenant be up to date in his 
rental payments. The amendment to the statute raises some doubt 
whether all of these requirements, and especially notification of intent 
to withhold rent, continue. In another enactment, to remove any dis-
pute concerning the issue, any agreement waiving the benefits of rent 
escrow or receivership was declared void by the legislature.23 
Rent escrow has been simplified by allowing its use within 24 hours 
after a tenant request for a housing inspection is submitted to the 
responsible public agency.24 Unfortunately, however, the amendment 
is silent as to whether the tenant request may be oral or need be in 
writing. For some unknown reason, the receivership provision was not 
20 The leading case condemning this practice is Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 
(D.C. Cir. 1967). 
21 Acts of 1969, c. 701. 
22 Acts of 1969, c. 855. 
28 Acts of 1968, c. 404, §2. 
34 Acts of 1969, c. 242. 
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similarly amended. Moreover, the precondition to successful rent re-
ceiverships, that is, appropriation of moneys to the revolving fund in 
the Department of Public Health, again died in committee.25 The 
typical receivership situation involves repairs requiring more than 
current or immediately realizable rents, and the 1965 legislation con-
templated a revolving fund which has never received appropriations. 
Can the poor be faulted for their cynicism when promises made are 
never fulfilled? 
Late in 1969, a comprehensive housing and urban renewal bill, 
Chapter 751, was enacted. This legislation, aside from some adminis-
trative reshuffling, constitutes a recodification of existing provisions. 
Section 32 of Chapter 751, which regulates the operations of low rent 
housing projects, differs in but minor respects from the statute it 
superseded. As formerly, housing authorities are mandated to lease 
accommodations only "within the financial reach of persons and fami-
lies of low income," but "low income" is still not defined. Housing 
projects are to be operated with rentals fixed at the "lowest possible 
rates," but these same rentals - although subsidized to some extent-
must produce revenue sufficient to pay the principal and interest on 
bonds, insurance, reimbursements to municipalities in lieu of taxes, 
statutory reserves, and recreational and community facilities. Federal 
and state subsidies are usually pegged to permit welfare recipients to 
live in public .housing, and there often occurs a situation in which the 
wage earner whose salary falls below public assistance benefit levels 
is financially unable to pay the minimum rentals required to operate 
public housing. Moreover, elderly public housing tenants, whose in-
come is disgracefully low, must allocate a disproportionately high 
percentage of their income to rent payments. It seems inconsistent with 
the concept of low income public housing for such housing to be 
beyond the reach of the very poor, and perhaps repeal of reserve re-
quirements and payments in lieu of taxes would improve matters. An 
alternative solution would be to increase subsidies and to peg rentals 
at a reasonable percentage of income.26 
Section 32 continues the discretion allowed to housing authorities in 
computing continued tenant eligibility to exclude either $100 of a 
minor's annual income or any or all of that income. The $100 exclu-
sion of a minor's income for a family's initial eligibility for occupancy 
also remains a part of the statute, and a bill submitted to abolish this 
requirement and to exclude all of their income in the case, of students 
and minors was referred to study in the 1969 session.27 With low in-
come housing in such short supply, any discretion, especially financial, 
entrusted to public housing administrators can lead to serious abuses. 
Moreover, minors, particularly if they are students, should not be re-
26 See Law Reform Newsletter 31 (Oct. 1969). 
26 Such a proposal is currently before the Congress. 
27 See Law Reform Newsletter 31 (Oct. 1969). 
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quired-to!ea:ve-the family home ~ a result wWch mayin fact .occur--
when their earnings are added in computation of the family's eligibility 
for public housing. 
Aliens, unless honorably discharged from military service or eligible 
for old age assistance, continue to be denied public housing in a 
manner which seems to defy visceral notions of equal protection.28 
Preferences for selection of public housing tenants remain as before. 
It would seem that the concept of "first come, first served" should by 
now have been included in the legislation, with exception for such 
rational preferences as extended to those displaced by urban renewal. 
Bills requiring the publication of both eligibility standards and the 
posting of waiting lists for public housing were referred to study.29 A 
bill limiting the reasons for denial of admission to public housing was 
also referred toa study committee.3o Either by oversight or by design, 
the philosophy of participation by tenants in housing project manage-
ment with a view toward ultimate ownership by tenants was not in-
cluded in Chapter 751. However, the philosophy that there is a place 
for tenants on the boards of housing authorities was impliedly, albeit 
negatively, recognized by a bill prohibiting their voting in matters 
affecting their own interest.31 
Bills forbidding evictions from public housing except for cause and 
mandating collective bargaining between housing authorities and ten-
ant organizations, both originally enacted in 1968, were retained. 
"Cause" for eviction is not defined, perhaps because of a legislative 
hope that the proper purview of the term could be worked out during 
a management-tenants' organization negotiating process.32 
Most grievances of public housing tenants usually center around 
the very one-sided leases they are required to execute before occupancy 
is allowed. Almost all of these leases are from month-to-month and 
regulate the terms and conditions of occupancy in detail. It would 
have been beneficial had the General Court given some thought to 
legislating a model lease with terms relating to purely local conditions 
left to bargaining between the parties. A further oversight, which the 
authors have brought to the attention of the appropriate legislative 
committee, was the inadvertent repeal of a bill passed a month prior 
to Chapter 75l's enactment which required housing authorities to con-
tract with municipalities for police protection for the tenants.ss This 
bill was designed to remedy the situation which existed in certain 
localities where police declined jurisdiction over the property of hous-
ing authorities. A far stronger bill is being drafted to require a night 
28Acts of 1969, c. 751. . 
29 L.w Reform Newsletter 82 (Oct. 1969). 
80 Ibid. 
31 Acts of 1968, c. 271, §l. . 
32 See Comment, Nonfinancial Eligibility and Eviction Standards in Public 
Housing - The Problem Family in the Great Society, 53 Cornell L. Rev. 1122 
(1968). 
83 Acts of 1969, c. 630. 
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policeman on duty in projects containing more than 200 units. In the 
past, some legal services attorneys had doubt as to whether housing 
inspection codes applied to public housing projects. This should not 
have been the case since Section 26S of Chapter 121, now recodified as 
Section 28 of Chapter 12lB, was and is quite explicit in this regard. 
On the next to last day of the 1969 legislative session, the much 
publicized so-called "anti-snob" zoning bill was passed.34 While· this 
statute itself does not authorize the construction of housing, it certainly 
facilitates such construction. The thrust of this very important legis" 
lation is to generate increases in housing for low and moderate income 
tenants and to deghettoize the inner-city by scattering housing avail-
able to its residents. The bill furnishes mechanisms for overriding 
suburban practices which obstruct the construction of low and moder-
ate income housing. Also, local red tape, while not completely elimi-
nated, has been greatly lessened. 
As significant as was the legislation enacted in 1969, several other 
important housing bills were either killed or referred to study and 
most likely obscurity. Proposed legislation to establish an implied 
warranty of fitness in the leasing of residential housing and to create 
tort liability for landlords where they fail to provide essential services 
failed of enactment.S5 
In usual contrast, very little happened litigatively. Whether this 
results from failure by litigants to pursue appellate remedies for various 
reasons, or from the sad fact that the Commonwealth has but one 
court of record, is academic. This situation is appalling considering 
the size of Massachusetts and the complexity of its institutions. Advo-
cates for the poor receive very little judicial guidance in the Common-
wealth. . 
In Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency v. New England Mer-
chants National Bank of Boston,36 several banks refused to purchase, 
as agreed, notes issued by the plaintiff (MHF A) to finance multi-dwell-
ing housing. MHF A had been established in 1966 to provide mortgage 
financing at "favorable" rates for the construction of housing projects 
in which approximately one quarter of the tenants would be low 
income and the others classified as moderate income. The defendarit 
banks contended, among other things, that providing benefits to moder~ 
ate income families was not a public purpose and relied on an earlier 
advisory opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court to that effect. The 
Court decided otherwise, noting that its advisory opinions.are "open to 
reconsideration and revision." It brushed aside discussion of the social 
desirability issue, finding it to be within the competence of the legis-
lature to determine that the mixing of families of economic means will 
provide for the prevention and permanent elimination of slums,57 and 
84 Acts of 1969, c. 774. For an extensive discussion of this statute, see§14.1 
infra. 
85 Law Reform Newsletter 82 (Oct. 1969). 
861969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 987, 249 N.E.2d 599 (1969). See also, §lO.linfra. 
87 MHFA notes are exempt from Massachusetts property and income taxes and 
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that it was explicit and implied in the legislation setting up the 
MHFA that substantial benefits would inure to low income families, 
benefits to those of moderate income being but incidental. 
Two housing discrimination cases were also decided in the 1969 
SURVEY year. In LaPierre v. Massachusetts Commission Against Dis-
crimination,38 a case involving refusal to negotiate in good faith in 
respect to the renting of an apartment, the Supreme Judicial Court 
construed the term "national origin" as including those of Puerto 
Rican ancestry. The second decision involved construction of Chapter 
151B, the antidiscrimination statute, which has been construed to apply 
to all rentals of dwelling accommodations except where, in the case of 
single or two-family housing, the lessor advertises the availability of an 
apartment by word of mouth. This loophole has been closed by the 
decision in Harris v. jones,39 where the court quoted extensively from 
jones v. Alfred H. Mayer CO.40 Judge Caffrey in Harris dismissed a 
claim for damages both as de minimus and as not proven. However in 
a later decision, Pina v. Homsi,41 damages were awarded for unlawful 
discrimination in renting a dwelling, an issue which was not adjudi-
cated in jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. Thus, it seems that all bases 
have been touched in effectively prohibiting rental discrimination. 
§9.5. Education. The increased radicalization of ghetto residents 
has led them to vocalize their growing recognition of the inferior edu-
cation that their children are receiving.1 That ghetto schools are in fact 
educationally inferior has been amply demonstrated, and much is 
being done on both the feq.eral and state levels to equalize educational 
opportunities for minorities.2 Federal enrichment programs such as 
Project Headstart and revolutionary ventures such as an experimental 
tuition voucher plan are currently being implemented in low income 
areas.8 On the state level, the Committee for Community Educational 
Development has received funding from both the Commonwealth's 
Department of Education and the Ford Foundation to conduct an 
experimental school in the Roxbury area.4 
The Roxbury community has pointed out that the only way in which 
it can achieve both the quality and curriculum reform in education 
which it desires is for neighborhoods to achieve some control of schools 
also from federal income taxes. MHFA may therefore borrow and lend at lower 
rates. 
88 SM Mass. 165, 2S6 N .E.2d 192 (1968). 
89296 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Mass. 19(9). 
40 S92 U.s. 409 (1968). 
41 Civil No. 69·666-G (D. Mass., decided July 9. 1969). 
§9.5. 1 The legal services program of the OEO has also become involved by 
funding a Center for Law and Education jointly sponsored by Harvard's Law 
School and Graduate School of Education. The center's prospectus notes that it 
serves as a backup center to OEO legal services offices and also tries to aid other 
groups interested in educational reform. See S Clearinghouse Rev. 159 (Nov. 19(9). 
2 See J. Coleman et al., Equality of Educational Opportunity (1966). 
a Interview with Christopher S. Jenks, co-director, Cambridge (Mass.) Institute. 
in Boston, Dec. 9, 1969. 
'Bay State Banner, Nov. ?:I, 1969, at 1, col. S. 
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within their boundaries. It was this desire which led to the short-
lived community take-over at the Gibson School in Roxbury in the 
fall of 1968 when a group of parents led their children from a public 
school building into a "freedom school" which they had designed and 
controlled. II The result of cries for community control of education 
such as were heard at the Gibson School in Boston and in the Ocean 
Hill-Brownsville district of New York City6 has been that community 
participation is becoming recognized as a necessary part of the edu-
cational system in ghetto neighborhoods. Federal funding is now avail-
able for community groups that wish to become involved in this 
process. In Roxbury, federal moneys were obtained by the King-
Timilty Advisory Council, an elected community group which has 
negotiated with the Boston School Committee regarding such essential 
issues as the school committee's hiring practices for administrative and 
staff positions.7 
Along with community control, residents have demanded a share of 
the political control of the Boston school system. One attempt to 
achieve this necessary political control occurred when Owens v. School 
Committee of Boston8 was filed requesting the federal district court to 
invalidate the at-large election of the Boston School Committee. The 
request was filed on the grounds that although petitioners - black 
children who attended the Boston schools, and their parents in the 
dual capacity of parents and voters - constitute a significant racial 
minority, the effectiveness of their franchise has been diminished by 
the at-large system of election and the consistently unfavorable white 
voting pattern which has resulted. Petitioners claimed that this dilu-
tion of their voting strength constitutes a denial of rights protected by 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Con-
stitution. The petitioners requested a preliminary injunction to pro-
hibit an impending at-large election and proposed as an alternative a 
district method of election. The motion for an injunction was denied 
on two grounds. The court initially held there was no constitutional 
duty requiring a city using an at-large election system to adopt a dis-
trict system "in order to better the chances of a minority group to 
secure representation of their own particular interests."9 The court also 
felt that to enjoin the forthcoming election would harm the city of 
Boston by "placing it in a position where it would be without any 
properly constituted authority to operate its schools."10 
II Interview with C. Grayson, a Roxbury teacher, in Boston, Dec. 10, 1969. Litiga-
tion arising from this event will be argued before the Supreme Judicial Court in 
March 1970. 
6 See M. Hell and A. Hevesi, The Politics of Urban Education (1969), for a 
superb analysis of the New York City school crisis in 1967 and 1968. For a legal 
perspective, read Comment, School Decentralization: Legal Paths to Local Con-
trol, 57 Geo. L.J. 992 (1969). 
7 Bay State Banner, July 10, 1969, at 1, col. 3. 
s S04 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Mass. 1969). 
II Id. at 1529. 
10 Id. at lS5!. 
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There has been much recent litigation contesting the unequal treat-
ment accorded ghetto residents attending schools, usually in Boston, 
in their own neighborhoods. One such case was Barclay v. Connors.11 
The issues in Barclay concerned public school children who had been 
placed in special classes based upon performances in intelligence tests 
which were indisputably biased against them because of cultural and 
socio-economic factors inherent in the test. A complaint was filed by 
the parents with the Commonwealth's Department of Education. The 
parents stated they had not been informed that their children were to 
be placed in these special classes, nor were they notified of their rights 
to appeal such a decision. The case was settled when a comprehensive 
agreement was reached with the Department of Education regarding 
the procedures to be utilized in determining when children shOUld be 
placed in special classes. The agreement provided that all parents must 
be notified of the decision to place their children in such classes, which 
right includes review of the decision and the rights to be represented 
by an attorney, to examine all school records concerning the child, and 
to introduce testimony of expert witnesses as to the child's capacities. 
Finally, the Department of Education was convinced to begin a thor-
ough review of previous placements into special classes to discover if 
erroneous prior placements had been made. 
Another area in which there has been an unequal distribution of 
educational facilities has been in the provision of school lunches under 
the National School Lunch Act.12 That act requires a local school 
system to make free school lunches available to those children who are 
the most economically and nutritionally needy before free lunches are 
provided for other students. During the 1968-1969 school year, although 
free lunches were available at 46 of 47 junior, middle and high schools, 
students at only 9 of 156 elementary schools had participated in the 
program. In Briggs v. Kerrigan,IS the federal district court held that 
the failure to make free school lunches available to younger students; 
who often have greater economic and nutritional needs than some of 
the older school children who have been receiving these lunches, was 
not in violation of the act. 
The open enrollment policy of the Boston public schools, which 
permits students to attend any school in the city school system which 
has unfilled seats after all children from the local district have been 
enrolled, has somewhat alleviated the disparity in the quality of edu-
cation found in different areas of the city. However, once ghetto stu-
dents have enrolled in schools in other neighborhoods there is no 
guarantee that they will be treated fairly at the local school. In one 
case, Owens v. Devilin,14 petitioners, four Roxbury residents who had 
enrolled in a Brighton junior high school, and were summarily ex-
11 Law Reform Newsletter 7 (Oct. 1969). The leading case in this area is Hobson 
v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967). . 
1242 U.s.C. §§1751·1761. 
18118 L. W. 21170 aan. 6. 1970). 
14 Law Reform Newsletter 9 (May 1969). 
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pelled, sued for readmission. The defendant Brighton school principal 
contended that it was within the local school's discretion to expel 
students from other than the local area. The court granted a temporary 
injunction which required the local school to readmit the students. 
The case was further resolved when the Boston School Committee 
agreed to amend its rules to provide minimum standards for the sus-
pension or transfer of students. The amended rule now provides that 
no student may be transferred or suspended from school for more than 
ten school days without adequate notice and hearing.15 
The increased activism of ghetto residents regarding schools has ex-
tended to the students themselves at the high school as well as the 
university level. Both groups of students have been involved in demon-
strations protesting the quality and relevance of the education they 
are receiving. The disruption of classrooms with attendant violence 
has led the General Court to prescribe mandatory imprisonment for 
persons who "willfully and repeatedly" cause school disturbances.1o In 
the same legislation, the penalty for criminal trespass was increased 
from a fine of $20 to $100, thereby imposing a pecuniary loss as well 
as threat of imprisonment for such action.17 Section 123 of Chapter 266 
was also amended to prohibit trespassing upon the land belonging to 
a public institution of higher learning.18 If the trespasser remains on 
such land after being requested to leave by an officer of the institution, 
he is subject to being punished by fine or imprisonment. Finally, a 
desire to minimize the possibility of violence occurring during college 
or university demonstrations led the legislature to make the possession 
of a firearm on university grounds a criminal offense.19 
§9.6. Employment. Lack of adequate employment opportunities 
is often cited as a primary cause of poverty.1 This lack of jobs for 
ghetto residents results in large part from discrimination. Discrimi-
nation in employment is double edged since it includes both racial bias 
and discrimination against all poor, regardless of their race, based upon 
lack of marketable skills.2 In the past two years there have been numer-
ous attempts made to end both of these forms of discrimination. 
In an effort to combat discrimination against the unskilled, which, 
although not overtly racial, has racial effects, Chapter 15lB of the 
General Laws was amended to prohibit an employer from refusing to 
hire a potential employee because of that person's failure to furnish 
information regarding his arrest and conviction for a misdemeanor, if 
the misdemeanor had occurred ten or more years previously and if the 
15 Ibid. 
10 Acts of 1969, c. 463, §1. 
17Id. §2. 
18 Acts of 1969, c. 362. 
19 Acts of 1969, c. 441. 
§9.6. 1 The leading work in this area is A. Ross and H. Hill, Employment, 
Race, and Poverty (1967). 
2 Ibid. 
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individual had not been given a prison sentence.8 In the past, em-
ployers' requirements for disclosure of this information had tended 
toward discrimination against residents of ghetto areas, where many 
factors combine to bring about a high incidence of juvenile delin-
quency. Now, errant actions as a juvenile may no longer impair the 
career of one who has matured into a responsible and potentially pro-
ductive member of society. 
Another legislative change in the employment discrimination area 
was the amending of Chapter 15lB to provide a clear exemption for 
religious or denominational groups from its strictures.4 Any such group 
which is "operated, supervised or controlled by or in connection with 
a religious organization, and which limits membership, enrollment, 
admission, or participation of members of that religion" may, without 
violation of the state's antidiscrimination law, give preference in hiring 
and employment to members of that religion. Although this amend-
ment does appear to be a deviation from the legislature's previously 
announced policy against discrimination in employment, before it is 
condemned it must be weighed against another and an equally valid 
policy, i.e., the preservation of the religious life of citizens of the 
Commonwealth. When these two policies appear to conflict, it may be 
argued that it is better to allow the hiring practices that religious 
organizations have adhered to since their formation to be legally 
permitted. This provides for the continued vitality of such religious 
organizations, and the nuinbers of employees are so few that this ex-
emption will have little effect on the job picture as a whole. The con-
trary argument is obvious. 
Most cases involving employment discrimination are not brought to 
court but rather are heard and decided by the Massachusetts Commis-
sion Against Discrimination, which is empowered to provide an appro-
priate remedy.1S As the commission acts as a judicial body and its 
decisions are binding as precedent, its written opinions are valuable 
to both attorneys and potential claimants and should be available for 
their perusal. In recognition of this need for publication, the legis-
lature has amended the statute defining the duties of the commission 
to provide that copies of their opinions must be maintained in the 
commission's office and be available for public inspection during regu-
lar business hours.6 
There has also been some litigation in the employment area filed by 
legal services attorneys. One such action dealing with retaliatory termi-
nation, Luce v. Boston Redevelopment Authority,7 has been filed in the 
federal district court to protest the refusal of the Boston Redevelop-
ment Authority (BRA) to employ the plaintiff, who is a Catholic priest. 
S Acts of 1969, c. 314. 
4 Acts of 1969, c. 216. 
IS C.L., c. ISIB, §3. 
6 Acts of 1968, c. 218. 
7 Law Reform Newsletter 3 (May 1969). 
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The plaintiff had previously been employed by United South End 
Settlements (USES), a private organization which had contracted with 
BRA to provide relocation services in the South End urban renewal 
area. When the contract between the BRA and USES ended, plaintiff 
sought employment with the BRA's relocation department. His appli. 
cation was at first accepted but later disallowed. He alleged that the 
BRA refused to hire him because of statements he had made disparag-
ing the BRA's relocation policy. He claimed that the BRA's retaliatory 
action in refusing to hire him deprived him of his right of free speech 
and his rights to assemble and petition government for a redress of 
grievances and to freely practice his religion. The BRA filed a motion 
to dismiss under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.s 
In the area of employment discrimination a class action was filed 
against the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority on behalf of 
76 trainees of the Opportunities Industrialization Center (OIC) and 
225 other black and Spanish.speaking applicants for the position of 
bus driver-collector.9 They protested the MBTA's hiring on the basis 
of scores achieved on general aptitude tests. The action was begun 
when only 16 of 76 black and Spanish-speaking applicants who had 
participated in an MBT A-sponsored training program for the job of 
bus driver-collector passed the test. This represented a 79 percent re-
jection rate for blacks and Spanish-speaking applicants, as compared 
to a 22 percent rejection rate for whites. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the 
MBTA from 
... using as a criterion for hiring the general aptitude tests or 
any other test which had not been properly validated as a predic-
tive of or significantly correlated with important elements of work 
behavior, comprising or relevant to the specific job of driver/col-
lector, and on the basis of a sample of subjects representative of 
the multi-racial potential employee source in the Boston area.10 
Petitioners sought to require the MBT A to change its present hiring 
practice and to institute a system where one black and one white 
employee would be hired alternately as vacancies arise until the racial 
composition of the MBT A's workers was equivalent to the racial 
composition of the city of Boston. Judge Garrity, speaking for the 
court, agreed with the petitioners that there was no relationship be-
tween an applicant's score on the general aptitude tests and his ability 
to perform the job for which he had applied. The court felt that when 
the effect of such a test "is to discriminate against disadvantaged mi-
8 This motion was denied, and this is the status of this case at this writing. 3 
Clearinghouse Rev. 198 (Dec. 1968). 
9 Arrington v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, Civil No. 69-681-G 
(D. Mass., filed Dec. 22, 1969), memorandum and order denying· preliminary in-
junction. 
JO Law Reform Newsletter 3 Guly 1969). 
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norities, in fact denying them an equal opportunity for proper employ-
ment, then it becomes unconstitutionally unreasonable and arbitrary.ll 
The injunction was denied, however, for lack of an appropriate and 
equitable remedy. An injunction which would give preferential treat-
ment to the remaining blacks on the list would do so "at the expense 
of the remaining whites who, far from being beneficiaries of previous 
discriminations, may well be just as much the innocent victims of a 
system of hiring that hinders the culturally disadvantaged."12 
In recent months increased attention has been given to the failure ot 
unions, especially construction unions, to allow blacks membership. 
Membership in most construction unions is based either upon family 
relationship or union evaluation of the applicant's fitness for member· 
ship, utilization of both of which standards can result in discriminatory 
practices. Many methods have been tried to encourage unions to change 
their admission policies. These range from on-site picketing on con-
struction sites in several cities,18 to the so-called Philadelphia Plan. 
The Philadelphia Plan, recently passed by Congress, requires con-
tractors bidding on federally aided projects costing $500,000 or more 
to increase the number of blacks among their total employees from 
about 5 percent to approximately 25 percent within the next five 
years. 
In contrast to the legislative and litigative remedies possible to cor-
rect abuses in the area of racial bias, discrimination against the poor 
because of their lack of employable skills can best be solved by train-
ing programs. During the past few years many manpower programs 
have been instituted at the federal level.14 Their success has been 
varied. Many of these programs have succeeded in teaching the ghetto 
resident a needed trade only to have him find that there is no industry 
in the depressed area in which he lives where he can put his new skill 
to work. It is not enough, therefore, merely to train potential workers. 
Industry must be developed so that these workers will be assured of 
an opportunity to use that training. This realization has led both 
government officials and private foundations to increased emphasis of 
the program of black economic development. 
§9.7. Black economic development. Black economic development 
is viewed as one method of ameliorating the increased polarization 
between blacks and whites by allowing the. black community to obtain 
an increased share of the national wealth.1 This view has led to a series 
of programs encouraging potential minority group entrepreneurs to 
11 Anington v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority. Civil No. 69-681-G. 
at 6. 
12Id. at 10. 
18 Interview with Martin Gopen. employment specialist. New Urban LeagUe of 
Boston. in Boston. Dec. 2. 1969. 
14 Job Development for the Hard to Employ. MDTA Findings No. 4 (U~S. Dept. 
of Labor. June 1968). 
§9.7. 1 The most comprehensive study of this area is contained in Black Eco-
nomic Development (W. Haddad and G. Pugh eds .• 1969). 
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establish their own businesses. The types of programs which have 
arisen range from the Small Business Administration's Economic Op-
portunity Loan Project,2 which finances black capitalists, to OEO fund-
ing for community development corporations (CDC), which seek to 
involve entire ghetto communities as participants in industrial efforts.8 
The theory is that, once CDC's are established and operating, profits 
may be spun off for community betterment enterprises. The concept 
of the community development corporation arose from the proposed 
Community Self-Determination Act,. introduced before Congress in 
1968. Although the status of this bill is uncertain at this time, Ii many 
CDC's have nevertheless been formed with government and foundation 
financing. 
The proponents of black capitalism feel that what is needed is for 
minority group members to be given incentives which will enable them 
to enter the mainstream of the American capitalist system and compete 
in the open market. The advocates of community-based economic de-
velopment ventures view black capitalism as exploitative and argue 
that conditions and institutions make it impossible for the black 
people to enter the capitalist system; rather, it is felt, they must 
develop their own economic structures, which will respond directly to 
the needs of the entire black community. 
Big business has responded to demands for black economic develop-
ment by joining in a partnership with black entrepreneurs to initiate 
the operation of subsidiary businesses.8 An example of this arrange-
ment is the Avco plant in Roxbury which, at the prodding of govern-
ment, has recently been established.7 
All this activity has had considerable impact on the Roxbury com-
munity. Since 1967, there have been 147 economic oppottunity loans 
extended by the Small Business Administration, and, most significantly, 
not one default has occurred to date.s Statistics such as these have led 
many to believe that economic development is perhaps the most promis-
ing solution currently available to reduce the grinding poverty found 
in inner-city neighborhoods. 
There are, however, two major stumbling blocks to most current 
economic development effotts. First, many prospective entrepreneurs 
do not have the training and skills necessary to be successful in busi-
ness.1I In order for this difficulty to be overcome it is necessary that the 
242 U.s.C. §§2901 et seq. 
8 See Desiderio and Sanchez, The Community Development Corporation, 10 
B.C. Ind. Be Com. L. Rev. 217 (1969). 
4 See Miller, Community Capitalism and the Community Self-Determination 
Act, 6 Harv. J. Legis. 41!1 (1969). 
Ii Ibid. 
8 See generally E. Ginzberg, Business Leadership and the Negro Crises (1968). 
'1 The Boston Globe, Aug. 2, 1969, at 82, col. 2. 
Slnterview with Aubrey Barrette, minority loan officer, Small Business Adminis-
tration, Roxbury office, in Boston, Oct. 9, 1969. 
, I) See Garrity, How Law and Graduate Business Students Can Help, 25 Bus. 
Law. 201 (1969). 
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manpower training programs discussed earlier be coordinated with 
economic development ventures to structure that type of training which 
will be useful to both the potential employee and to the prospective 
entrepreneur. Second, there is an appalling scarcity of equity capital 
in ghetto communities.10 There are few ghetto residents who have 
been able to marshall the necessary venture capital to establish busi-
nesses. If black economic development is to become successful on an 
even larger level than it is currently achieving, lending institutions 
will have to lower their requirements for extending equity capital in 
situations involving minority entrepreneurship, or private foundations 
will have to demonstrate more willingness than they have previously 
manifested to supplement loans by banks. 
§9.8. Municipal services. Residents of low income neighborhoods 
have increasingly come to feel that they are not receiving their fair 
share of municipal services when they contrast their environment with 
conditions beyond the city limits.1 Their main grievances are that less 
money per pupil is spent for inner-city schools than for suburban 
schools, that community recreational facilities are in a state of extreme 
disrepair, and that ghetto trash collection is both infrequent and poorly 
performed. It has been suggested that inner-city residents could argue 
that this discriminatory treatment violates equal protection rights, but 
as of this date no litigation along these lines has been attempted in 
Massachusetts.2 
A somewhat subtle municipal services issue which has yet to be pre-
sented before a court, but which perhaps should be litigated, is the 
inequality of services existing among various city districts.s For exam-
ple, although unintentional, it seems to be discriminatory to provide 
a two-foot sewer pipe for the approximately 10,000 residents of a me-
dium income city district while allowing a four-foot sewer pipe to clog 
continually in a ghetto area which has 80,000 inhabitants. Does equal 
protection entitle citizens only to the same amount of sewer pipe in 
every section of the city, or does it extend to mandating the supplying 
of the same amount of sewer pipe per citizen? This sewer pipe example 
could be replicated to cover such other services as trash collection, po-
lice and fire protection and school and recreational facilities. If such 
an argument were to be successful, it would result in a total restruc-
turing of existing concepts of provision of municipal services. 
Municipal services involves not only the provision of physical facil-
10 See Sturdivant, The Limits of Black Capitalism, 47 Harv. Bus. Rev. 122 Gan. 
1969). 
§9.8. 1 The seminal article in this area is Ratner, Inter-Neighborhood Denials 
of Equal Protection in the Provision of Municipal Services, 4 Harv. Civ. Rights-
Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 1 (1968). 
2 Litigation is being prepared, however. Interview with Michael Feldman, at-
torney, Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, in Boston, Nov. 4, 1969. 
S See generally Ratner, Inter-Neighborhood Denials of Equal Protection in the 
Provision of Municipal Services, 4 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. R:ev. 1 (1968). 
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ities but also the delivery of social services to the community.' Realizing 
the importance of such social services to the low income neighbor-
hoods, the General Court in 1968 established the new state Depart-
ment of Community Affairs.1I This department was created with the 
mandate to "mobilize the human, physical, and financial resources 
available to combat poverty and provide economic training and open 
housing opportunity .... "6 To accomplish these goals the department 
is authorized to provide technical assistance to community groups 
needing and desiring social service resources. 
There have been several additional attempts to make municipal 
services more responsive and meaningful to low income citizens and 
also to give them an opportunity to participate in the governmental 
process. One manifestation of this trend was the amendment of the 
Commonwealth's civil service law to allow the exempting of up to 30 
employees of a Model Cities Program from qualifying for their posi-
tions under civil service requirements.7 This was done in order to per-
mit Model Cities' agencies to employ residents of the neighborhoods 
for appropriate positio~s. 
Another such phenomenon has been the institution of "little city 
halls" in neighborhoods within the city of Boston.S They serve as de-
centralized sites for filing complaints and disseminating information 
and also allow city government the opportunity to become aware of 
grassroots sentiment and opinions within the various disparate com-
munities which constitute the city of Boston. 
Perhaps the most effective method to achieve governmental respon-
siveness is to relieve the political impotency of inner-city neighbor-
hoods by increasing their voting power. However, within the last two 
years, in only one out of three instances where this approach was tried 
was it successful. In Dinis v. Harrington,9 the federal district court 
declared the apportionment of the city of New Bedford to be in viola-
tion of the "one man, one vote" principle as announced by the Su-
preme Court in Avery v. Midland County.10 The court ordered the 
city to come up with a new plan which would "redistrict the voters 
into wards in which each voter has, as nearly as practical, an equally 
effective voice in the election process. lOll Chapter 424 of the Acts of 
1965, which prohibited any city officials from redistricting voting areas 
until 1974 insofar as such a redistricting would restrict the ability of 
the relevant officials to carry out required reapportionment, was de-
termined to be unconstitutional. 
'See Jones, Overview of Services to Individuals and Families, in Individual 
and Group Services in the Mobilization for Youth Experience 25 (H. Weissman ed. 
1969). 
II Acts of 1968, c. 761. 
«lId. §5. 
'I Acts of 1968, c. 605. 
S The Boston Globe, June 14, 1969, at 11, col. 2. 
8285 F. Supp. 411 (D. Mass. 1968). 
10590 u.s. 474 (1968). 
11 Dinis v. Harrington, 28S F. Supp. at 412. 
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The opposite result was reached by the Supreme Judicial Court in 
a case involving the reapportionment of multi-seat legislative districts. 
In Newman v. Commissioners to Apportion Suffolk County,12 peti-
tioners, registered voters of Ward 4 in Boston, sought a writ of man-
damus to force the commissioners to designate Ward 4 as a separate 
district with one representative. The petitioners based their claim 
primarily on the general language of the apportionment statute, which 
provides that "each voter's representative ... will represent an equal 
number of legal voters as nearly as may be."13 The statistics which 
were introduced by the petitioners demonstrated that districts with 
similar population density had been designated as single representa-
tive areas. The Court found that despite the facts the commissioners 
could have constitutionally permitted Ward 4 to be a single member 
district, and although there may have been some inconsistency in their 
performance in apportioning Ward 4 as compared with some other 
wards, their adions were all within their discretionary powers. "The 
apportionment process," the Court declared, "is primarily a matter for 
legislative consideration. If the process has been carried out reasonably 
and without arbitrary conduct, this Court has not interfered with the 
judgment of those entrusted with the task by the Legislature .... "14 
The Court found, therefore, that the facts at hand did not represent 
a violation of the commissioners' discretionary powers. 
The federal district court reached the same result as the Supreme 
Judicial Court in Owens v. School Committee of Boston,1G a case dis-
cussed previously, which also involved multi-member districting, this 
time the district comprising the entire city of Boston. Owens involved 
a challenge to the at-large system of electing members of the Boston 
School Committee. Petitioners, bringing suit on behalf of all the black 
citizens of Boston, claimed that under the system at issue they were not 
able to elect a member of their race to the school committee. They ar-
gued that since the black community was segregated into one central 
district within the city, if the electoral system were divided into single 
member districts, they might be able to command sufficient votes in 
one district to elect a representative responsive to their interests. The 
court held that, where there is no showing of an affirmative discrim-
inatory practice, "a City which has for a long time and for sound rea-
sons used the at-large system [need not] adopt a district system in order 
to better the chances of a minority group to secure representation of 
their own particular interests."16 
Both the Newman and the Owens cases recognize that multi-mem-
12 1968 Mass. Adv. Sh. 117, 241 N.E.2d 16!!. 
18Id. at 1120, 241 N.E.2d at 165. 
14Id. at 112!!, 241 N.E.2d at 167-168. 
1G !!04 F. Supp. 1!127 (D. Mass. 1969). 
16Id. at 1!129. For further study of this problem see Banshaf, Multi-member 
Electoral Districts-Do They Violate the "One Man, One Vote Principle?" 75 
Yale L.J. 1!109 (1966); and Comment, Reapportionment, 79 Harv. L. Rev. ·1228 
(1966). . 
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ber districts are constitutionally permissible so long as the requisite 
constitutional standards of fairness and equal voting power are met. 
Owens, however, goes somewhat further than Newman by indicating 
that a multi-member district might be considered invalid if it were 
"deliberately adopted for the purpose of minimizing the voting influ-
ence of some group within the electorate."17 
§9.9. Police and the community. In recent years inner-city res-
idents have vented their anger and frustration at the causes and condi-
tions of their poverty by rioting.1 These riots have in turn led to a 
further alienation of the police and the residents. Massachusetts has 
been fortunate in that there has been but one serious civil disorder 
where there occurred a direct confrontation between the police and 
the community at large. There have, however, been several preventive 
steps taken to assure protection of the rights of both the individual 
citizens and the police should such an upheaval occur. 
Several statutes have been enacted which respond to situations likely 
to occur during civil disturbances. It is hoped that by providing, and 
then publicizing, regulations which govern police-community relations 
the knowledge of the consequences to follow this proscribed conduct 
will deter potential rioters from such a course. To this end Chapter 
265 of the General Laws was amended to provide a minimum penalty 
for committing an assault and battery upon a police officer or fireman 
engaged in the performance of his duty.2 The punishment to be in-
curred is imprisonment for not less than ten days nor more than two 
and one-half years, or a fine to range between a minimum of $100 and 
a maximum of $500. 
Although the physical violence which occurs during a civil disorder 
and which often causes death and injury to participants and bystand-
ers alike is the most serious and abhorrent feature of riots, the loss of 
property which results from fire damage and looting spells economic 
ruin and disaster to many others. One device which is frequently used 
in these situations and which causes great damage is the Molotov cock-
tail. Again the theory of preventive deterrence was employed when 
the General Court made it a criminal offense to have in one's posses-
sion or control such a device.s In addition to prescribing both impris-
onment and/or a fine for this violation, the statute provides for the 
arrest without a warrant of anyone who violates this act and allows 
him to be held in jail until a complaint may be filed. There is a pro-
viso to the statute, which requires the complaint to be filed within 24 
hours. 
17 304 F. Supp. at 1329. 
§9.9. 1 Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (N.Y. 
Times ed. 1968). See also H. Bagley and H. Mendelsohn, Minorities and the 
Police: Confrontation in America (1969). 
2 Acts of 1969, c. 359. See also Acts of 1968, cc. 563 and 579 for provisions 
relating to emergency conditions during civil disorders. 
8 Acts of 1969, c. 431. 
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The Massachusetts Bar Association has appointed a Subcommittee 
on the Prevention of Civil Disorders.4 The primary function of this 
subcommittee is to mobilize attorneys to be present at the scene of any 
such disorder to advise participants of their legal rights. The subcom-
mittee has also, in association with the Boston Police Department, pro-
posed a series of conduct guidelines for attorneys present at the scene 
of a disorder. These guidelines recognize that an attorney may be 
present at the scene of a demonstration or disorder as an observer, 
mediator or counsel without being considered a participant. The 
guidelines, therefore, provide that an attorney who is performing these 
functions shall not be arrested. They contain three major points. First, 
if an attorney who is acting in this role is mistakenly arrested, the bar 
association and the Boston Police Department agree to attempt to ob-
tain the attorney's release, to permit him to resume his activities and 
to try to secure a pretrial dismissal of all charges against him. The sec-
ond guideline places upon the attorney the burden of making his pres-
ence and status known to the law enforcement officers present at the 
disorder. The police are given a corresponding duty to apprise them-
selves of the status of the attorney. The third and final guideline al-
lows attorneys acting as mediators or observers to remain present at 
the disorder although demonstrators are being arrested. An attorney 
acting in that capacity may stay at the scene of a disorder until he is 
advised by a law enforcement official with the rank of captain or <tbove 
that his continued presence may result in imminent physical injury 
to the attorney. Once the attorney has been so advised, and if he then 
refuses to leave, he may be escorted from the scene of the disorder, but 
the attorney may not be arrested if he refuses to depart. II 
One of the major reasons for the exacerbation of police-community 
relations has been the feeling on the part of residents that the police 
are not sensitive towards them and their problems. A policeman's job 
often requires him to achieve an understanding of a people who are 
culturally, ethnically or racially different from himself. This is a diffi-
cult task. Education is often viewed as the best method of merging the 
gap between two cultures. By requiring policemen to have completed 
a high school education,6 the Massachusetts legislature hopes that the 
police of the future will have gained a knowledge of the world in 
which they live of sufficient breadth to attune them to the neighbor-
hoods in which they serve. An increased empathy on the part of the 
police towards the community in which they work would result in an 
amelioration of the relations between the two groups. 
What is perhaps most urgently needed to ensure understanding 
between the police and ghetto residents is a recruitment program on 
4 One of the authors, Professor Garrity, is currently serving as chairman of 
this subcommittee. 
II See "What Lawyers Can Do in Response to the Report of the Commission on 
Civil Disorders," American Bar Association and Lawyers Committee for Civil 
Rights Under Law Institute (1968). 
6 Acts of 1969, c. 484. See generally, Skolnick, The Police and the Urban Ghetto 
(1968). 
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the part of metropolitan police departments among minority groups. 
When a ghetto resident sees that the neighborhood policeman is a 
member of his own race, it is felt that he will begin to think of law 
enforcement as a force which is working for him rather than against 
hi 1 m. 
§9.10. Conclusion. Since the 1967 SURVEY article dealing with 
Poverty Law, to repeat the point made previously in this article, both 
the poor themselves and their legal advocates have been radicalized 
to achieve radical change. The poor no longer silently brood concern-
ing the harsh conditions of their lives. They have united to demand 
increased benefits and power from society. This phenomenon can be 
observed in each of the substantive areas previously discussed. In pub-
lic assistance, welfare mothers have demonstrated for increased bene-
fits. Public and private housing tenants have joined in rent strikes. 
Parents of inner-city students have taken over neighborhood schools. 
Black workers have been jailed for illegal picketing on all white con-
struction sites. 
Where the poor have felt they have encountered discrimination, 
they have not hesitated to challenge institutions in court to demand 
an end to injustice. In the case of Local Finance Co. v. Massachusetts 
Commission Against Discrimination,l for example, a finance company 
was prohibited from requiring a prospective applicant's race to be 
entered on the loan application form on the grounds that since the 
company "is open to and solicits the patronage of the general public," 
it fits within the definition of a "place of public accommodation" 
within the meaning of G.L., c. 272, §§92A and 98, and is thus prohib-
ited from making any distinction on the basis of color.2 
The radicalization of legal advocates for the poor is reflected by the 
increased number of attorneys who are devoting their energies and ex-
pertise to eliminating the causes and conditions of poverty. As noted 
previously, this can be seen in the increased number of legal services 
programs and in the corresponding rise in the numbers of attorneys 
employed by these programs. Sharp increases in the dedication of legal 
resources for the poor may also be viewed in the increased amount of 
de bono publico work undertaken by private practitioners, in the es-
tablishment locally of such organizations as the Lawyers' Committee 
for Civil Rights Under Law, and in an increased social awareness on 
the part of bar associations, such as the Boston Bar Association's spon-
sorship of a low income housing project. This combination of in-
creased activity on the part of the poor and their legal representatives 
has and shall continue to generate much activity in the poverty law 
area.8 
7 Ibid. 
19.10. 11968 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1287,242 N.E.2d 5!16. 
2Id. at 1291,242 N.E.2d at 5!18. 
8 The most comprehensive reading list in this area is found in Harvith, Poverty 
and the Law: A Course Outline and Reading List, !I!I Albany L. Rev. 48 (1969). 
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